

CHAPTER 1 (13:20)

Jeff: You, you start the conversation, which I think is a is a is a fairly contemporary way to initiate the conversation, by saying what is your definition of safety? And in that first chapter, you do sort of honor Eric a bit.

Sid: Of course, of course, of course

Jeff: But I think that's a beautiful place to start. So just questioning the very definition of the S-word is a terrific place to start.

Sid: And so everybody's asking, all right, if we're not going to count absence of negatives, what do we count? And so this is, of course, the next frontier. So those of you may have heard of [the capacity index or the due diligence index](#), that's what we're working on right now. So we're combining typical Anglo common law country due diligence requirements under which boards can get in trouble and organizations get in trouble. Regulators get really excited about. I look at these terms and go, how could you get excited about this? I mean, what is the rest of your life like if this excites you? But so due diligence requirement. But what we've done actually in the literature, published literature is to to marry that to the resilience precepts and concepts and say how does this relate to resilience engineering? And came up basically with six indicators that could hopefully start to dim the light on TRIFR (Total Recordable Injury Frequency Rate) and LTI's. Remember, it's not the LTI, it's in the book, the LGI, they're looking good index, right? That's all it is.

Jeff: But what I think you tee up in that chapter, what I like about that is that is that ten years ago there was a lot of concepts pointing towards a better definition. And I think that you guys go a long way to framing that up. But you allow this space for people in their organizations, in their operational cultures to question that themselves and to perhaps begin with a reflection on what their definition is. To own their definition.

Sid: To own their definition true. True. And at the same time, not necessarily saying, you know, throw everything overboard because you understand the (Thomas) Kuhn-ian imperative, you know, that you can't allow people to have one paradigm and chuck it overboard. And then, you know, not have a ready-made other one to take its place. And so and again, lots of credit goes to Eric and Eric sort of stubborn single mindedness relative to this point, right. That, you know, for safety we've been talking about unsafety for as long as we talk about safety because it's nonsense. Right. And in fact, so Eric and I had a Ph.D. student, an obstetrician, who said to us, You silly, silly bastards. Right. This this definition of safety is as if you're saying, so what's the secret to staying married healthily and happily for the rest of your days? Right. And the way to study that in safety is to focus on two or three cases of divorce. And in case of domestic violence, you study that and you do your ICAMs (Incident Causation Analysis Method) and your root causes on those. You go, oh, my God, let's do the recommendations. More rules, more procedures, more. You know, let's not do that. And then you think you can remain healthily and happily married for the rest of your days? What utter nonsense. If you want to study how to stay happily and healthily married, then, you know, looking at those who have succeeded it, what are the capacities, what makes it so? . And that was always Eric's point. And I don't know, it's a privilege to, in fact, you know, take it with talk and run with it and articulate it in a way that just becomes a gut punch. Okay, stop it. Safety is not an outcome, right? And you cannot manipulate outcomes. In fact, you do that at

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university, you get fired, right? You manipulate the dependent variable of the experiment, you lose your job!

Jeff: It's just It's just too late, right? As an outcome, it is too late. We've missed our opportunity.

Sid: It's too late. Well, and it's too small, too little, too too. You know, it's not a lot of data.